A process model of the understanding of uncertain conditionals by Kleiter, G.D. et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ptar20
Thinking & Reasoning
ISSN: 1354-6783 (Print) 1464-0708 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ptar20
A process model of the understanding of
uncertain conditionals
Gernot D. Kleiter, Andrew J. B. Fugard & Niki Pfeifer
To cite this article: Gernot D. Kleiter, Andrew J. B. Fugard & Niki Pfeifer (2018): A
process model of the understanding of uncertain conditionals, Thinking & Reasoning, DOI:
10.1080/13546783.2017.1422542
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2017.1422542
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 16 Jan 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 155
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
A process model of the understanding of uncertain
conditionals
Gernot D. Kleitera, Andrew J. B. Fugardb and Niki Pfeiferc
aDepartment of Psychology, Universit€at Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria; bDepartment of
Psychosocial Studies, School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of
London, London, UK; cMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universit€at M€unchen, Munich, Germany
ABSTRACT
To build a process model of the understanding of conditionals we extract a
common core of three semantics of if-then sentences: (a) the conditional event
interpretation in the coherencebased probability logic, (b) the discourse
processingtheory of Hans Kamp, and (c) the game-theoretical approach of
Jaakko Hintikka. The empirical part reports three experiments in which each
participant assessed the probability of 52 if-then sentencesin a truth table task.
Each experiment included a second task: An n-back task relating the
interpretation of conditionals to working memory, a Bayesian bookbag and
poker chip task relating the interpretation of conditionals to probability
updating, and a probabilistic modus ponens task relating the interpretation of
conditionals to a classical inference task. Data analysis shows that the way in
which the conditionals are interpreted correlates with each of the
supplementary tasks. The results are discussed within the process model
proposed in the introduction.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 20 June 2016; Accepted 4 December 2017
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For nearly thirty years I have been vainly trying to convince them that this
assumed invariable equivalence between a conditional (or implication) and a
disjunctive is an error. (MacColl, 1908)
Introduction
Between the 1950s and the 1990s, the psychology of reasoning distinguished
deductive and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning was oriented at clas-
sical logic. The best-known experimental paradigm from this time is the
Wason Selection Task. Inductive reasoning was considered to be part of deci-
sion theory and judgement under uncertainty. At the end of the previous
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millenium, “probability” entered the research on human reasoning. A special
1993-issue of the journal Cognition is a witness of the beginning of a cross-
talk between “reasoning” and “decision-making” research (Johnson-Laird &
Shaﬁr, 1993). Researchers (Chater & Oaksford, 1999, 2001; Oaksford, Chater, &
Larkin, 2000) started to model human reasoning in terms of probabilities and
not in terms of traditional logic. Researchers (Chater & Oaksford, 1999;
Oaksford & Chater, 2007) proposed an account of syllogistic reasoning in line
with an interpretation of conditionals in terms of the conditional probability.
A group around Evans and Over (Evans, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004; Evans,
Handley, & Over, 2003; Over & Evans, 2003; Hadjichristidis, Over, Evans, Han-
dley, & Sloman, 2005) published a series of studies on the human understand-
ing of indicative conditionals, if–then sentences. They found that the majority
of participants interpreted the probability of a conditional as a conditional
probability and not as the probability of a material implication. Inﬂuenced by
the work of de Finetti and the modern extensions of de Finetti's theory of sub-
jective probability (Biazzo & Gilio, 2000; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; de Finetti,
1995, 1972, 1974), Kleiter and Pfeifer proposed to model human reasoning by
probabilistic versions of nonmonotonic reasoning (Pfeifer, 2002; Pfeifer &
Kleiter, 2003, 2005). In Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, and Kleiter (2011) and Pfei-
fer and Kleiter (2005a, 2007), we observed that humans interpret indicative
conditionals predominantly as conditional events. Not only indicative condi-
tionals were found to be interpreted as conditional events. There is also evi-
dence that human reasoning about causal and counterfactual conditionals is
consistent with the conditional event interpretation (Over, Hadjichristidis,
Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; Pfeifer & St€ockle-Schobel, 2015). Conditional
events also turned out to be important for developing a new rationality
framework for categorical syllogisms (Gilio, Over, Pfeifer, & Sanﬁlippo, 2017).
This highlights a tight connection of reasoning about quantiﬁed statements
and reasoning about conditionals. It was shown that the conditional event
interpretation accounts for concessive conditionals (Even if A, then still C)
(Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2016). For an extensive overview of
the psychology of conditionals and conditional reasoning, see Nickerson
(2015).
Thus, the study of conditionals started a paradigm shift in human reason-
ing, a shift from classical two-valued logic to probability and probability logic
(Elqayam & Over, 2012; Pfeifer, 2013; Pfeifer & Douven, 2014). Why condition-
als and why probability?
 Conditionals are fundamental to reasoning. They are part of inference
rules like the modus ponens, the modus tollens, or the hypothetical syl-
logism. They are essential to causal and counterfactual reasoning. They
are involved in practically any form of inference. Conditionals are the
grain of salt in the consequence relation and in logical entailment.
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 Probability because every-day reasoning is uncertain. It is a requirement
of ecological validity. Classical logic cannot provide the relevant ques-
tions, hypotheses, experimental tasks, or benchmarks for uncertain
reasoning.
Within the many interpretations of probability, it is quite natural to favour the
subjective approach, that is, an approach in which probabilities are conceived
as degrees of belief, as properties of the content of a cognitive system of a
reasoner or decision-maker.1
The conditional in the coherence approach
The probabilistic paradigm of reasoning is closely related to the coherence
approach in probability theory. This approach goes back to de Finetti (1964,
1974) and his theory of subjective probability. It was and is further developed
in three scientiﬁc communities: (i) In the coherence group (Coletti & Scozza-
fava, 2002; Lad, 1996), (ii) in the imprecise probability group (Augustin, Colen,
de Cooman, & Troffaes, 2014; Walley, 1991), and (iii) in a group of logicians
working on probability logic (Adams, 1975; Jeffrey & Edgington, 1991; Kleiter,
in press; Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994). In the coherence approach, the conception
of a conditional event and of conditional probability differs from the corre-
sponding conception in standard theories of probability; it differs especially
from the conception in the Kolmogorov approach (Kolmogoroff, 1977).
The non-probabilistic and the probabilistic paradigms of reasoning differ (i)
in the way in which the premises and the conclusions of an inference are rep-
resented, (ii) in the way in which they are valuated, and (iii) in the way in
which the quality of inferences is evaluated. The non-probabilistic approach
represents, on the background of classical logic, the premises and the conclu-
sions by propositions. The propositions are valuated by binary truth values, T
and F. The inferences are classiﬁed as valid or nonvalid.
The probabilistic approach conceives the premises and the conclusions of
an inference as events. Events are valuated by the indicator values 0 and 1,
that is, by numbers. The numbers may be multiplied by probabilities, the
products may be summed up, and thus ﬁnally lead to an expected value. The
expected value of the indicators of an event is called its prevision (Augustin
et al., 2014; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; de Finetti, 1974; Walley, 1991). The
indicators are uncertain quantities (de Finetti, 1974; Gilio & Sanﬁlippo, 2013;
Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994). In the literature, propositions and indicators are
1Sometimes the subjective interpretation of probability is called “Bayesian”, often however, for no other
reason than to avoid the term “subjective”. The subjective probability theory goes back to de Finetti and
the brilliant forerunner Ramsey. De Finetti was strongly inﬂuenced by Bridgman's operationalism of the
early 1930s. So his approach was “behavioural”, not “cognitive” (Kleiter, 1987).
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often denoted by the same symbols, e.g., when we read E = 1 or E ¼ 02. For
the discussion of the semantics of conditionals, the distinction between truth
values and indicator values can be helpful, however. We will write IE or IH for
the indicators of E and H, respectively. Propositions are logical entities; events,
and especially conditional events, are mathematical entities. In the probabilis-
tic approach, the quality of inferences is evaluated by one of several different
forms of coherence.
In many situations, a person considers some propositions and has only
incomplete knowledge whether they are true or false. The person may, how-
ever, make an assumption3 about the truth of an event.
To keep the following sections less abstract, we introduce the example
shown in Figure 1. A set of similar tasks will be used in the empirical part of
the paper. The response format of the task requires to assess a probability in
the form of an “X out of Y” response. The frequencies of the objects and col-
ours are selected so that different interpretations of the conditional corre-
spond to different X ¡ Y pairs. In the example shown in Figure 1, the answer
“8 out of 10”corresponds to a material implication “3 out of 10” to a conjunc-
tion, 4 out of 10 to a biconditional, and “3 out of 5” to a conditional event, etc.
Using the notation in Table 1, this corresponds to (a + c + d)/n, a/n, (a + d)/n,
and a/(a + b), respectively.
The uncertainty of a conditional event is operationalised by a bet on E|H:
You win if H and E are true, you lose if H is true but E is false, you get your
money back if H turns out to be false (the bet is annulled) (Table 2).
Here you see ten cards showing red and blue houses and cars.
The cards are put in a stack, shuﬄed, and one card is randomly drawn.
How sure can you be that the following sentence holds?
If the card shows a car, then the card shows red
Your answer is: “ . . . out of . . . ”. (Fill in two numbers)
[red] [red] [blue] [red] [red] [red] [blue] [red] [red] [blue]
Figure 1. A task that allows to identify your interpretation of an if–then sentence. On the
computer screen, the objects are shown in colour; here they are written in brackets
below the objects.
2We write both :E and E for the negation and E^H and EH for the conjunction.
3Thomas Bayes introduced conditional probabilities by suppositions: “Hence, of two subsequent events,
the probability of the ﬁrst be aN, and the probability of both together
P
N, then the probability of the second,
on the supposition that the ﬁrst happens is Pa” (Bayes, 1763, p. 379).
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A conditional E|H represents a person's knowledge about E assuming H to
be true. The truth value of a conditional event is TRUE if both H and E are true,
FALSE if H is true and E is false, and “undetermined” if H is false (compare
Figure 2). The logical status of the “undetermined” valuation of a conditional
has given rise to discussions. An early paper of de Finetti (1995) may have
contributed to this misunderstanding. Speaking of a “defective truth table”,
e.g., is misleading. Also, saying false antecedents are “irrelevant” is not right
as the “money-back” valuation is of course relevant. Baratgin, Over, and Polit-
zer (2013) proposed to use the term “uncertain” instead of “undetermined”. In
fact, if the antecedens H is false, then the truth value of the conditional event
E|H is substituted by the value of the conditional probability P(E|H). In terms
of the betting metaphor, this corresponds to the “money back” condition. But
of course, the “third” value is not a truth value, but a probability. Mathemati-
cally, these relationships are represented by linear spaces and handled by
Table 1. Identiﬁcation of the interpretation of the conditional in the exam-
ple in Figure 1 by an X-out-of-Y response: Conditional event a/(a + b), con-
junction a/n, material implication (a + c + d)/n, biconditional (a + d)/n.
Red Blue
P
Car a = 3 b = 2 a + b = 5
House c = 4 d = 1 c + d = 5P
a + c = 7 b + d = 3 n = 10
Table 2. Valuation of the conditional event E|H. IH, IE, and IE|H denote the
indicator values of the events H and E and of the conditional event E|H.
IH IE IE|H Bet
1 1 1 Win
1 0 0 Lose
0 P(E|H) Money back
HH
EH EH
[red] [blue]
Figure 2. The trievent partition EH; EH;H
 
for the conditional “If the card shows a
house, then the card shows red”. The colours of the objects are written in brackets.
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linear equations. In the equations, the coefﬁcients are either the indicator val-
ues 0 and 1 (replacing the truth values “true” and “false”) or conditional prob-
abilities (jumping in for the unknown truth values of the conditional event in
the case the antecedent is false). Formally, the truth-value of a conditional
event becomes a random variable; it is not a logical entity anymore.
For an easy-to-comprehend explanation of many of the psychologically rel-
evant aspects of the truth values of conditionals and conditional bets, the
reader is referred to Over and Baratgin (2017) and to Politzer, Over, and Barat-
gin (2010). More mathematically, Lad (1996) gives an introduction to probabi-
listic inferences with conditional events with the help of systems of linear
equations and linear and fractional programming. The logical side of the
interpretation of conditionals as random variables is outlined in an excellent
article by Stalnaker and Jeffrey (1994) in the Festschrift for Adams. Stimulating
is also an early paper of Jeffrey (1963).
The vertical bar “|” is not a propositional operator. Conditionals cannot be
nested or iterated like conjunctions or disjunctions. The conjunction of two
conditionals, (E|H)^(G|K), for example, is not a proposition. The vertical bar is a
mathematical operator that applies to the indicator values of events, i.e., to 0
and 1, and not to truth values. Conditionals may be nested or iterated if the
indicator values are combined with probabilities; degrees of belief are then
measured by previsions in conditional random quantities. (Biazzo, Gilio, &
Sanﬁlippo, 2009; Gilio & Sanﬁlippo, 2013; Gilio, Pfeifer, & Sanﬁlippo, (2016;
Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994; Sanﬁlippo, Pfeifer, & Gilio, 2017; Sanﬁlippo, Pfeifer,
Over, & Gilio, 2018; Van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Elqayam, & Over, 2015).
The expected value or, equivalently, the prevision of a conditional bet is a
real number,
E if H then Eð Þ ¼ IEH ¢u winð Þ þ IEH ¢u loseð Þ þ IH ¢u price of the betð Þ : (1)
Here, u(¢) denotes the utility of winning, of losing, and of the price of the bet,
respectively. If the utilities are normalised with u 0(win) = 1, u 0(lose) = 0, and u 0
(price of the bet) = u(price of the bet)/[u(win) ¡ u(lose)] = P(B|A), the prevision
becomes a real number in the interval [0, 1],
E EjHð Þ ¼ IEH ¢1þ IEH ¢0þ IH ¢P EjHð Þ : (2)
A person has a degree of belief about the truth of E under the assumption that
H is true. The degree of belief may be modelled in a psychological theory by a
subjective conditional probability P(E|H).
In the example (Figure 1), the probabilities of the various events are esti-
mated by the relative frequencies of the according cards. So if the probability
of a conditional is assessed by the “X-out-of-Y” format, its probability is simply
P if H then Eð Þ ¼ X
Y
: (3)
The “X-out-of-Y” assessment allows to infer the interpretation of the
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conditional from X and Y. In the construction of the tasks,it is important to
choose the frequencies of the different cards such that one and only one inter-
pretation from a set of alternative interpretations can be inferred.
The conditional event interpretation provides a formal logico-mathemati-
cal model of the understanding of conditionals. To explain the human under-
standing of conditionals, the model should be placed into a cognitive
“environment”. There are three ways in which this can be accomplished: (i) To
give the conditional event interpretation a more procedural ﬂavour, (ii) to
connect it with other theories of the conditional, and (iii) to study empirically
its relationship to other cognitive functions. Below we will ﬁrst propose a pro-
cedural version of the conditional event interpretation. We will then highlight
the close relationships to other theories, and ﬁnally report the results of three
experimental studies.
So let us start with the procedural process model. If people have enough
time, think carefully, and try to do their best, then they interpret an if–then
sentence by the following sequence of steps. The steps are shown in Figure 3.
a. Identify the referents. Identify the typical referents of the antecedent and
the consequent. In our example, these are two cards, one showing the
shape of a house and one showing the colour red. The shape and the
colour are represented in two masks and stored in working memory.
“If the card shows a house, then the card shows red.”
X
Y
a
b
c
d
e
f
[red]
[red] [blue]
Figure 3. Procedural interpretation scheme of an uncertain conditional. (a) Identify the
referents, (b) focus on the antecedent, (c) focus on the conjunction, (d) count the number
of cases verifying the conjunction = X, (e) reprocess the antecedent, (f) count the number
of cases verifying the antecedent = Y; the dashed line indicates the projection of X on Y
leading to the conditional probability, in the example 3/5 = .60. The colours of the
objects are written in brackets.
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b. Focus on the antecedent. In one or more passes, the attention scans the
universe of the ten images with the mask for the antecedent. The posi-
tions of some or all images that match the mask are stored in the work-
ing memory.
c. Focus on the conjunction. The masks for the antecedent and the conse-
quent are overlayed so that a new mask represents the conjunction of
the antecedent and the consequent.
d. Scan. Count the cases where the conjunction mask matches the instan-
ces. The count will be the “X” in the ﬁnal “X-out-of-Y” response.
e. Fix the interpretation. The conjunction and the antecedent are related to
each other in the following steps:
 Mark as suppositional: mark the antecedent as “hypothetically true”;
the hypothetically true cases become the updated universe.
 Reprocess the antecedent: turn back to step b and count the number
of cases matching the mask of the antecedent and store the count
as Y,
f. Re-standardise. Relate X, the count of the conjunctions, to Y, the count
of the antecedents. This is comparable to a “zooming-in” on the proba-
bility of the antecedent. All cases not verifying the antecedent are ﬁl-
tered out and removed.
g. Search for counterexamples. Especially, in an unfamiliar setting, check
the assessments, e.g., by scanning the complements of the antecedent
or the consequent.
h. Respond. X out of Y.
If the if–then sentence is interpreted as a conjunction, then the loop (e) in
Figure 3 turns back to the original universe with all the ten cards. There is no
zooming-in on the set of cases verifying the antecedent.
We next show how the process model relates to two theories on the condi-
tional, to the discourse representation theory of Kamp and Reyle and to the
game theoretical approach of Hintikka and Carlson.
Discourse representation theory
Propositional logic combined with some probability theory is not sufﬁcient to
characterise conditionals in every-day conversation or reasoning. Proposi-
tions, truth tables, and probabilities per se are too meagre to model condi-
tionals in discourse. We have to unpack the propositions and look “inside”, at
their subjects, predicates, relations, and functions. Kamp (1984) and Kamp
and Reyle (1993) proposed a theory on discourse processing that builds an
interface between formal logic and language processing. Especially, its
detailed characterisation of the steps necessary for the interpretation of
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connectives – like the conditional – provides a rich framework for a more cog-
nitive approach to the human understanding of conditionals.
Take as an example the conditional “If the card shows a car, then the card
shows red”. It connects the two sentences “the card shows a car” and
“the card shows red”. In terms of Kamp's and Reyle's schemes of discourse
representation, the following two boxes correspond to the respective two
sentences:
x y
card(x)
car(y)
x shows y
and
u v
card(u)
red(v)
u shows v
x and u refer to one and the same card. The card in the consequent refers to
the same card as in the antecedent; it functions as an anaphora. y and v
denote the referents car and red. In Figure 3, the referents are represented in
step (a) at the top of the ﬁgure. The representation of the conditional takes
the antecedent sentence and supposes it to be veriﬁed. The ﬁrst sentence
conveys the supposition “The card shows a car”. In the process model, this cor-
responds to step (e), mark as suppositional.
The box below shows the next steps in Kamp's and Reyle's discourse repre-
sentation theory. Both sentences are processed together as indicated in the
interior box on the right hand side. “It is only the sentence pair … as a whole
which makes a claim, a claim to the effect that if the information carried by
the ﬁrst sentence is correct then so is the additional information carried by
the second” (Kamp & Reyle, 1993, p. 142). In the process model, this corre-
sponds to step (c), focus on the conjunction.
x y
card(x)
car(y)
x shows y
⇒
x y u v
card(x)
car(y)
x shows y
u = x
red(v)
u shows v
“… the ﬁrst sentence … describes a hypothetical situation; the second sen-
tence extends the description of that situation; and the sentence pair asserts
that if a situation is of the ﬁrst kind it is also of the more fully speciﬁed second
kind” (Kamp & Reyle, 1993, p. 142) The “)” denotes the hypothetical relation
which holds between the two situation descriptions (Kamp & Reyle, 1993,
p. 142).
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The conditional builds a relation between the suppositional antecedent
(indicated by the interior box on the left-hand side, corresponding to step (b)
in the process model) and the conjunction (indicated by the interior box on
the right-hand side, corresponding to step (c) in the process model). When
we add a probabilistic valuation to each of the two interior boxes, these valua-
tions mirror just the Y- and X-values of steps (d) and (e) in our model, the
probability of the conjunction, P(E^H), and the probability of the antecedent,
P(H). The probability of the conditional is just the ratio of the two valuations.
The discourse representation model4 of Kamp and Reyle invites the proce-
dural interpretation of the conditional as presented in the process model.5 It
also gives a hint how the interpretation by a conjunction may result. If the
antecedent is not reprocessed in an extra pass, then only the conjunction on
the right-hand side of the scheme remains. Neglecting the supposition in the
antecedent results in a conjunction. In terms of the frequencies of the various
kinds of cards in the example, the red cars are selected but not related to the
number of cars but to the number of all cards.
Game theory
Hintikka and Carlson (1979) and Hintikka (1983) introduced a game-theoreti-
cal semantics of conditionals. It is closely related to the conditional event
interpretation. After pointing to the inadequacies of the material implication
(the game G.), Hintikka proposed an interpretation of the conditional (G.
cond1) in terms of two games, the ﬁrst one on the antecedent, the second
one on the consequent. There are two players, You and Nature. A conditional
is true if and only if for all winning strategies on H, there exists a winning strat-
egy on E. “... a winning strategy for the defender of if H then E is a function
which maps every winning strategy for the defender of H onto a winning
strategy for the defender of E” (Hintikka & Carlson, 1979) [changed notation].
In the game-theoretic paradigm, conditionals are also non-classical three-val-
ued trievents: “If G(S) [the game on the conditional sentence S] is indetermi-
nate (if neither player has a winning strategy), S is neither true nor false”
(Hintikka & Carlson, 1979, p. 181).
The tree in Figure 4 shows the extensive form of a game and matches the
ﬁgures in Hintikka and Carlson (1979, p. 184) and Hintikka (1983, p. 53).
For each winning strategy in the game on H, there must be a correlated
winning strategy on E. To make sure that we consider all winning strategies
on H, the players, Nature and You, change roles. If You can ﬁnd a falsiﬁcation
4The more complex version extends the treatment to cases with anaphoric referents that may handle
examples like “If he likes it, then Jones owns the Buddenbrooks”.
5We do not understand why, in the light of this correspondence, Kamp and Reyle (1993, p. 158ff.) prefer
the material implication interpretation.
10 G. D. KLEITER ET AL.
of H, that is, if, with the changed roles, You can show that Nature loses the
game on H, then the overall game on the conditional stops. E “… comes into
play only when and after H has been veriﬁed, and its role will hence naturally
depend on the way in which H turned out to be true” (Hintikka & Carlson,
1979, p. 185) (notation changed). z denotes the set of winning strategies on
H. With changed roles, ξ denotes the set of falsiﬁcation strategies on H. h are
the losing strategies on E.F(z) is a mapping from the set of winning strategies
on H into the winning strategies of E (technically, a function on a function, i.e.,
a functional). “… the existence of a functional F which takes us from a suc-
cessful strategy in verifying H to a successful strategy in verifying E” (Hintikka
& Carlson, 1979, p. 186). Moreover, the game-theoretic paradigm shows paral-
lels to the betting metaphor of de Finetti's coherence approach. One differ-
ence between the logical and the probabilistic game is that in a logical game
the outcome is binary, You win or lose, while in the probabilistic game, the
outcome is an uncertain quantity.
The game-theoretical semantics of conditionals offers many psychologi-
cally interesting aspects. The representations in extensive form “… capture
the dynamics of natural language semantics” (Hintikka & Carlson, 1979,
p. 183) and the procedural ﬂow of the semantic information. The back and
forth of verifying and falsifying instances reminds us of the search for counter-
examples in Johnson-Laird's model theory. Johnson-Laird (2006, p. 213, note
You pay
−[λ1 · P (EH) + λ2 · P (EH) + 0 · P (H)]
HH
Nature loses
Money back
+[λ1 · P (EH) + λ2 · P (EH) + 0 · P (H)]
E
You lose
λ2
E
You win
λ1
ξζ
ηΦ(ζ)
Figure 4. Bet on a conditional: You buy the bet for the price of
λ1 ¢P EHð Þ þ λ2 ¢P EH
 þ 0 ¢P H  . If you win, you get λ1; if you lose, you get λ2. If H
turns out to be false, you get your money back. (Modiﬁed Figure of Hintikka and Carlson
(1979, p. 184) and Hintikka (1983, p. 53).)
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213 on p. 463) refers to Wittgenstein's language games and to Hintikka.
Unfortunately, however, he does not refer to the work of Hintikka and Carlson
(1979) in which these authors criticise the material implication and present a
game-theoretic semantics that coincides with the conditional event interpre-
tation. Reasoning often proceeds by inner speech in which dialogues are sim-
ulated. Arguments are tested by virtual examples and counter-examples. For
a highly stimulating source, see van Benthem (2014).
The amount bet on a conditional event corresponds to a random variable.
Assume you know the absolute probabilities P(H), P(EH), and P EH
 
. What is
your conditional probability P(E|H)? While Kolmogorov introduced P(E|H) by
deﬁnition, that is, by ﬁat, P(E|H) = P(EH)/P(H) (provided that P(H) > 0), de
Finetti derived it from the avoidance of a Dutch book, that is from avoiding
losing for sure (Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Kleiter, 1981; Pfeifer & Kleiter,
2009). Assume you are willing to pay the price b for the bet on the conditional
event E|H; b is conceived as the expected value (or the safety equivalent)
b ¼ λ1  P EHð Þ þ λ2  P EH
 þ 0 P H : (4)
The right-hand side is rewritten by λ1£ P(H)P(E|H) + λ2P(H)(1¡ P(E|H) or P(H)[P
(E|H)(λ1 ¡ λ2) + λ2]. Here, P(E|H) is the unknown term. Solving for P(E|H) gives
P EjHð Þ ¼ P EHð Þλ1 þ P EH
 
λ2  P Hð Þλ2
P Hð Þ λ1  λ2ð Þ : (5)
Standardising the payoffs λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0 give P(E|H) = P(EH)/P(E). The condi-
tional probability is coherent if and only if it satisﬁes the ratio formula. We
note that the conjunction plays an important role in the game-theoretic
semantics. It corresponds to winning two bets, the bet on H and the bet on E
given H is true. Also, the search for counterexamples ﬁts nicely into a game-
theoretic approach.
To summarise. The interpretations of conditionals in several different tradi-
tions and approaches converge: probability logic (Jeffrey & Edgington, 1991;
Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994), the coherence approach to probability theory
(Augustin et al., 2014; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Walley, 1991), discourse
processing (Kamp, 1984; Kamp & Reyle, 1993), and game-theoretic semantics
(Hintikka, 1983; Hintikka & Carlson, 1979). We take the loosely bundled com-
monalities as a process model of the human understanding of conditionals.
Motivation and goals
In the introduction, we have described several approaches to the interpreta-
tion of uncertain conditionals: probability logic, discourse processing, and
game theory. Their common core suggests a dynamic process model, i.e., a
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sequence of steps which taken together build a scheme for the processing of
uncertain conditionals. Moreover, we have argued that the conjunction inter-
pretation involves only a subset of these steps. To stop too early lures a con-
junction interpretation. The ﬁrst stop on the path to a conditional event
interpretation that provides a complete interpretation leads to the
conjunction.
In a previous experiment (Fugard et al., 2011), we observed that about 70%
of the participants interpreted if–then sentences as conditional events and
about 25% as conjunctions. The process model makes a number of predic-
tions about differences between the conditional event interpreters and the
conjunction interpreters. In the present investigation, we will (i) use a similar
method as in our previous experiment to classify conditional event and con-
junction interpreters and we will (ii) introduce several additional procedures
to test the predictions of the process model.
In the following sections, we report three experiments. In all three experi-
ments, the Card Task was administered. The Card Task consisted of a series of
52 truth table tasks, each one similar to Figure 1, and presented one by one
on a computer screen. The Card Task improved the Die Task which was used
in our previous experiment (Fugard et al., 2011). In addition, each experiment
included a second task: a working memory task in Experiment 1, a probabilis-
tic modus ponens task in Experiment 2, and a Bayesian updating task in
Experiment 3. We made the following predictions:
(1) Response time. The conjunction interpretation requires only the ﬁrst
steps of the process model. Thus, the model predicts that conditional
event interpretations take more time than conjunctions. The Card Task
was computer controlled; the computer measured the response times.
(2) Working memory. The assessment of the probability of a conditional
requires to move forward and backward on the path to a full condi-
tional event interpretation (compare Figure 3). Cognitive tags must be
set and retrieved. The cognitive organisation and handling of such tags
is ascribed to the functions of working memory. A task which measures
the efﬁciency of such a process is the n-back task. It requires the contin-
uous updating of memory content. Process management is more
important than the mere capacity or buffer size. Persons who systemati-
cally interpret conditionals as conditional events are predicted to show
better n-back performance than persons who give conjunction
interpretations.
(3) Probabilistic modus ponens. The modus ponens is a central inference
rule in classical logic and it has often been studied empirically in human
reasoning research. We expect that participants who solve a probabilis-
tic modus ponens interpret conditionals as conditional events and nei-
ther as conjunctions nor as a material implication.
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(4) Bookbag and poker chip task. One of the classical tasks in the psychol-
ogy of judgement under uncertainty and decision-making is the book-
bag and poker chip task (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). It investigates the
sequential updating of probabilities by Bayes’ theorem in the light of
new evidence. We expect that participants who give predominantly
conditional event interpretations in the Card Task give probability
assessments that are closer to the Bayesian probabilities in the bookbag
and poker chip task.
(5) Object/colour ﬁrst. The example in Figure 1 visualises the antecedent
and the consequent of the if–then sentence by objects and features.
We speculated that conditionals in which the antecedent is an entity
(like a house or a car) and the consequent is a feature (like the colour
red or blue) are easier to process than in the other way round (Kleiter,
1986). In our previous study (Fugard et al., 2011), we observed, how-
ever, that the feature–entity order facilitated the conditional event
interpretations. Can the result be replicated?
Methods
Participants
We investigated a total of 240 participants in three experiments. In the Experi-
ments 1 (N = 80), 2 (N = 100), and 3 (N = 60), the participants were students at
the University of Salzburg. In none of the experiments, students of psychol-
ogy, mathematics, or philosophy and logic were tested. In all three experi-
ments, half of the participants were male and half were female.
Card task
The Card Task consisted of 52 tasks, each one similar to the introductory
example in Figure 1. Consider the sentence “If the card shows a house, then
the card shows red”. Using the notation of Table 1, we have for the condi-
tional event “a out of a + b”, the conjunction “a out of n”, the material implica-
tion: “a + c + d out of n”, for the biconditional “a + d out of n”, etc. The total
number of cards (n = 10) was held constant for all 52 tasks, while the values
of a, b, c, and d were chosen so that the different main interpretations (condi-
tional event, material implication, conjunction, reverse conditional event,
biconditional, defective biconditional) could uniquely be identiﬁed. This is an
important improvement of the Die Task used in our previous study (Fugard
et al., 2011).
The presentation of the Card Task was controlled by a computer program
written in Python (Van Rossum and the Python Software Foundation, 2008)
and supported by the PyGame library (Shinners, 2011). Before the
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presentation of the main task, a detailed and thorough computer controlled
instruction was given. To support the understanding of randomness, an ani-
mation demonstrated the shufﬂing of the cards. Four interactive examples
with absolute probabilities made sure that the participants understood the
response format and the handling of the keyboard.
There were four kinds of objects, cars, houses, birds, and ﬁshes, drawn in
one of four colours, red, green, yellow, and blue. Three example packs were
shown with different numbers of objects and colours.
The sequence of 52 tasks was presented to each participant, each task on a
new screen. Each screen showed 10 cards in one row and the text (in German)
The cards get shufﬂed. A random card is drawn. How sure can you be that the
following statement holds?
If the card shows a house, then the card shows red.
The conditional sentences were presented in a box to make the scope of
the question clear. Each presentation contained ten cards with two objects
and two colours, pseudo-randomly ordered. At the bottom of the screen, the
question for the assessment of the probability was presented; the response
format asked for the input of two numbers, “X out of Y”. The idea of using the
“X-out-of-Y” response format for investigating the probabilistic assessment of
conditionals was introduced in Politzer et al. (2010), Fugard et al. (2011) and
Barrouillet and Gauffroy (2013). Each task corresponds to a truth table task,
ﬁrst used by Evans et al. (2003) and by Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003).
The background of the screen was black. Before each task, the screen
showed a ﬁxation cross. Responses, that is, the probability assessments, were
given on a specially prepared keyboard. All keys except ten in each of the
two top rows were removed from a standard keyboard. The empty slots were
covered. On the keys in the two top rows, the numbers from 1 to 10 were
written.
Two response times, T1 and T2, were measured by the computer, one for
the ﬁrst number (the X) and one for the second number (the Y) in “X out of Y”.
In all three experiments, for one half of the participants, the object was in
the antecedent and the colour in the consequent of the conditionals (object–
colour order). For example: “If the card shows a car, then the card shows red”.
For the other half, the colour was in the antecedent and the object in the con-
sequent (colour–object order). For example: “If the card shows red, then the
card shows a car”.
The tasks were presented in four different orders, forward, backward, from
middle to ﬁrst and from the middle to last, from the last to middle and from
the ﬁrst to the middle. The assignment of a participant to one of the two
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object–colour conditions and to one of the four presentation orders
depended on the number of the participant obtained as he/she arrived at the
lab. It was controlled by a computer program, not by the experimenters. In
each experiment, gender and the object–colour order were balanced as in a
two-by-two design with equal cell frequencies.
The Card Task was administered individually in a quiet room in the lab of
the department. The display was a 1900 screen. In Experiments 1 and 2, the
experimenter was male, and in Experiment 3, the experimenter was female.
At the end of Experiment 1, the participants rated the conﬁdence that their
assessments were correct and the difﬁculty of the tasks. The participants were
paid 5 Euros for their participation.
Results
Each of the 240 participants answered the 52 questions of the Card Task by an
“X-out-of-Y” assessment, allowing to infer a total of 12,480 interpretations of
the if–then statements. Table 3 shows the overall frequencies of the different
interpretations.
With nearly 70%, the conditional event interpretation was the interpreta-
tion given most often, followed by the conjunction with about 20%, and a
few material implications and biconditionals.
We classiﬁed each participant by the interpretation he/she gave most
often, that is, by the participant's modal assessment; 76.67 % of the 240 partic-
ipants gave predominantly conditional event interpretations, 22.08 % con-
junction interpretations, and .01 % other interpretations.
We analysed the data by a Bayesian linear regression model. We used the
Markov chain Monte Carlo R-package MCMCglmm (Hadﬁeld, 2016a; Malsburg,
2017; R Development Core Team, 2016). For an introduction to this method,
see the tutorial (Hadﬁeld, 2016b) and the paper (Hadﬁeld, 2010); for the back-
ground of the Monte Carlo simulation method and its application in the
Bayesian approach, see Robert and Casella (2010), Sorensen and Gianola
(2010), Fitzmaurice, Davidian, Verbeke, and Molenberghs (2009), Diggle,
Heagerty, Liang, and Zeger (2002).
We ﬁrst focused on the conditional event interpretation (yes/no), a binary
dependent variable. The independent variables were the three ﬁxed-effects
position of the task (1, ..., 52), the presentation order object/colour
versus colour/object, and gender. The participants entered the model
as a random factor. The four different presentation orders of the 52 tasks
Table 3. Number of interpretations of the 240 £ 52 = 12, 480 conditionals.
Conditional event Conjunction Material implication Biconditional Other Total
8499 2686 17 77 1201 12,480
(68.10%) (21.52%) (0.14%) (0.62%) (9.62%) (100%)
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were ignored. We used a saturated log-linear model. Stochastic simulation
was done with 50,000 iterations and 1000 burnins. The vector of prior means
was set to zero for the ﬁxed effects and the variances in the precision matrix
were set to 10, inducing a ﬂat multivariate prior.
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis. Conditional
event interpretations were encoded by yes=1 and no=0 so that the inter-
cept of ¡0.265 logits corresponds to a “ground level” of 43.4% conditional
event interpretations at the theoretical (!) position zero at the beginning of
the sessions. The position effect adds cumulatively 0.020 logits at each of
the 52 task positions. This contributes ¡0.265 + 52 £ 0.020 = 0.775 logits or
68.5% to the level at the end of the sessions. Figure 5 shows the observed rel-
ative frequencies of the conditional event interpretations together with the
predictions obtained by the predict function of MCMCglmm.
It is obvious that in the course of the sessions, the frequency of conditional
event interpretations increased. Without any feedback, in a self-correcting
process, the participants “learnt” to interpret the if–then sentences as condi-
tional events. They more and more eliminated other interpretations and con-
verged towards the interpretation predicted by the process model.
Female participants were encoded by 0 and male participants by 1. The
gender effect adds 1.273 logits for male persons and is a strong effect. Origi-
nally, the factor gender was included in the experimental design as a control
variable. There are many factors which may have led to the observed gender
differences, for example, motivational factors or differences induced by the
educational system. A cognitive explanatory factor might be that higher fre-
quency of conjunctive interpretations by female participants results from a
stricter interpretation of conditionals. However, simply evenly dividing partici-
pants by gender is not strong enough to support any of these speculations.
There are multiple potential confounds. Our methodology is not strong
enough to discount the possibility that possibly multiple confounds exist. The
results do not allow to claim that gender by itself has an effect. We refrain
Table 4. Logistic regression analysis of the conditional event interpretation. All three
experiments combined (N = 240). Posterior means and lower and upper bounds of the
95% highest-posterior-density (HPD) intervals in logits of the coefﬁcients. Colons denote
interactions.
Post. mean l-95% HPD u-95% HPD pMCMC
(Intercept) ¡0.265 ¡0.458 ¡0.076 0.008 **
Position 0.020 0.014 0.026 <0.0001 ***
Gender 1.273 1.012 1.549 <0.0001 ***
Object/colour ¡0.428 ¡0.675 ¡0.172 0.001 ***
Position:Gender ¡0.012 ¡0.021 ¡0.003 0.009 **
Position:Object/colour 0.003 ¡0.005 0.011 0.512
Gender:Object/colour ¡0.322 ¡0.691 0.044 0.085 y
Position:Gender:Object/colour 0.012 ¡0.001 0.024 0.059 y
***pMCMC  0.001, **pMCMC  0.01, *pMCMC  0.05, and ypMCMC  0.1.
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from an attempt to give a psychological interpretation of the statistical
results.
Participants in the colour-ﬁrst group were encoded by 0, participants in the
object-ﬁrst group by 1. The negative object/feature effect subtracts
0.428 logits from the level for the object-ﬁrst order. This means, quite contrary
to the original hypothesis of Kleiter (1986), that the conditional event inter-
pretation was facilitated by the colour-ﬁrst order. Originally, we supposed
that it is easier to process an entity ﬁrst and only then its features and not the
other way round. In the experiment, however, it seems the colour of the
objects is easier to identify than the shape of the objects, which in turn sup-
ports the conditional event interpretation.
Highly similar results are observed in each of the three experiments. Table 5
shows the posterior means and the signiﬁcance levels of the three separate
analyses. The position and the gender effects are signiﬁcant in all three
experiments. The object/colour ﬁrst is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two
experiments and nearly signiﬁcant in the third one (pMCMC = .0522).
Does the Card Task induce more conditional event responses than the Die
Task used by Fugard et al. (2011)? Do the improved methods increase the
number of conditional event interpretation? Yes, in the present study with
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Figure 5. Observed relative frequencies of conditional event interpretations and model
predictions of the linear model. On the X-axis, the 52 positions of the tasks. Male (upper
lines) and female (below) participants; participants in the colour–object (solid) and the
object–colour (dashed) groups.
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the Card Task, the median was 88% conditional event interpretations per par-
ticipant, and in the previous study with the Die Task, the median was 72%.
Pfeifer (2013) argued that conjunctive responses may result from a strict
interpretation of the conditional. Here, the participants“ ... evaluate the truth
(and not the probability) of a conditional. Both, the conditional event C|A and
the conjunction A^C are true if A and C are true. However, both are strictly
speaking not true if :A (though C|A may be true if :A). Thus, if the participants
read the instruction such that the experimenter wants to know in which cases
the conditional is strictly speaking true, then the task cannot differentiate
between the conjunction and the conditional event interpretation”.Pfeifer
(2013) considers also the possibility that conjunctive responses result from
matching. The process model proposed in the present paper explains con-
junctive responses in a very similar way as proposed by Evans and Over
(2004), namely by incomplete processing. Jubin and Barrouillet (2017)
showed that framing the tasks in the context of the probability of the six sides
of a die may in part explain conjunctive responses. The reduced frequency of
conjunctive responses in the present experiments (referring to 10 different
cards) as compared to our previous study (referring to the six sides of a die)
(Fugard et al., 2011) may in part be explained by this proposal.
To summarise. The conditional event interpretation was the prevailing
interpretation of the conditional. A minority of the participants gave conjunc-
tion interpretations. There were no other systematic and stable interpreta-
tions. This replicates the original ﬁndings of Evans et al. (2003) and the results
of Fugard et al. (2011).
Change point analysis
Fugard et al. (2011) observed that a number of participants experience a sud-
den insight (Aha-Erlebnis) after which in the course of an experiment, the
interpretation shifts from non-conditional to conditional event interpretation.
For the present data, we performed the same Bayesian change-point analysis
(Tan, Tian, & Ng, 2010). We used a uniform prior probability of a change at
Table 5. Logistic regression analyses of the conditional event interpretation separately
for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The numbers are the means of posterior distri-
butions of the logistic regression coefﬁcients. Colons denote interactions.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
(Intercept) ¡0.657*** ¡2.662*** 0.801**
Position 0.016** 0.019** 0.029***
Gender 1.856*** 0.818** 0.721***
Object/colour ¡0.477* ¡0.536* ¡0.404y
Position:Gender 0.009 ¡0.023* ¡0.022
Position:Object/colour 0.011 0.002 ¡0.002
Gender:Object/colour ¡0.046 0.030 ¡0.421
Position:Gender:Object/colour ¡0.015 0.033* 0.020*
***pMCMC  0.001, **pMCMC  0.01, *pMCMC  0.05, and ypMCMC  0.1.
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position i, i = 1, …, 52, that is, with P(i) = 1/52 = .01923. We determined the
posterior probability distribution for a change point after task 4 and before
task 50 and considered a position with a posterior probability greater than .20
as a change-point. This corresponded to a Bayes factor of about 10 (0.2/
0.01923 = 10.4). Overall, 44 out of 240 participants (18.3 %) showed a signiﬁ-
cant change-point. All participants with a change-point shifted to a conditional
event interpretation. These participants had the feeling that the conditional
event interpretation ﬁts the understanding of the task.
Response time
The process model predicts longer response times for conditional event than
for conjunction interpretations. In Figure 3, the conditional event interpreta-
tion requires six steps while the conjunction interpretation requires only the
ﬁrst three ones. Moreover, we predicted that during the course of the 52
tasks, the participants will employ a more and more stable response strategy
that can be used “blindly”. This saves affords of testing and checking the
responses before the responses are actually made. It reduces the search for
counterexamples and inner dialogues. Based on the game theoretic seman-
tics outlined in the Introduction, we predict decreasing response times in the
course of the 52 tasks.
For each task, two response times were measured by the computer, one
for the X and one for the Y response in the X-out-of-Y assessments. For data
evaluation, both times were added.
The statistical analysis was again done with the MCMCglmm package (Had-
ﬁeld, 2010), now with the response time as the dependent variable. We used a
saturated model with the factors position, gender, and object/col-
our as in the previous logit analysis and included the interpretation as
an additional factor. The interpretation factor had the two levels con-
ditional event and conjunction; other interpretations were treated
as missing and not included.
Table 6 presents the posterior means and the lower and upper values of
the 95% highest-posterior-density (HPD) intervals of the regression coefﬁ-
cients for the signiﬁcant effects. Figure 6 shows the observed and the pre-
dicted mean response times for the 52 positions of the tasks. For Figure 6, the
other interpretations were included for the prediction analysis.
The main effects position and interpretation, and the interaction
gender:object/colour ﬁrst are signiﬁcant with pMCMC < 0.001. Simi-
lar results were observed in the separate analyses for each of the three experi-
ments. In Experiment 1, the intercept, the position and the gender
posterior means were 8355.490, ¡86.590, 136.783 seconds; in Experiment 2,
the values were 8835.190, ¡50.765, and ¡36.002; and in Experiment 3, the
values were 7069.589, ¡60.330, and ¡604.477, respectively. All these values
were signiﬁcant on the 0.0001 level. In Experiment 1, none of the interactions
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was signiﬁcant; in Experiment 2, two interactions were signiﬁcant on the 0.05
level. In Experiment 3, the gender:interpretation:object/colour
interaction was signiﬁcant on the 0.001 level.
Two predictions of the process model were supported: (i) conjunction
interpretations are faster than conditional event interpretations and (ii)
decreasing response times during the experimental sessions.
Table 6. Regression analysis of the response times. All three experiments combined (N =
240). Only the signiﬁcant effects of a saturated four-factorial analysis involving the factors
position, the interpretation, gender and object/colour are reported
in the table. The interpretation factor has two levels only, conditional event
interpretation and conjunction; other interpretations are treated as missing data. Poste-
rior means and lower and upper bounds of the 95% highest-posterior-density (HPD)
intervals in seconds. The colon denotes the interaction.
Post. mean Low-95% Up-95% HPD pMCMC
(Intercept) 7964.792 7597.442 8344.865 0.0001***
Position ¡69.325 ¡82.181 ¡57148 0.0001***
Interpretation 2235.854 1886.106 2577.619 0.0001***
Gender:Object/colour 1205.437 399.972 2001.615 0.002**
***pMCMC  0.001, **pMCMC  0.01.
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Figure 6. Observed and predicted mean response times (in seconds on the Y-axis) for the
52 positions (on the X-axis); conjunction (on the bottom), conditional event (in the mid-
dle), and other interpretations (on top).
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Post-experimental performance-ratings
At the end of Experiment 1, the participants rated the conﬁdence of correct
responses and the difﬁculty of the task. Ratings between 1 and 7 were used, 7
meaning high conﬁdence and high difﬁculty, respectively; the mean conﬁ-
dence was 4.107 (sd = 1.754), the mean difﬁculty was 1.201 (sd = 1.464).
Biserial correlations between the performance ratings and modal
responses are shown in Table 7.
Participants predominantly giving conditional event interpretations (modal
responses) were more conﬁdent that their responses were correct than partic-
ipants giving not conditional event interpretations. They rated the tasks as
not especially difﬁcult. Participants predominantly giving conjunction inter-
pretations tended to be uncertain about the correctness of their assessments.
The participant's “theory” of the understanding of conditionals is in line with
the theory of the present paper.
2-Back task
Individual differences in reasoning tasks and working memory correlate (Uns-
worth, 2015). The interpretation of conditionals is a highly relevant ingredient
of inferential reasoning. Is there a correlation between the interpretation of
conditionals and working memory capacity (WMC)?
The model of working memory was originally introduced by Baddeley and
Hitch (1974). In more than 40 years, the model has changed considerably.
Unsworth (2015) characterises WMC as a multifaceted capability that is
domain-general and independent of the difﬁculty of the involved tasks. The
multifaceted capabilities include the scope of attention, the control of atten-
tion, primary and secondary memory, and the protection against interference.
WMC is seen as the combination of these functions.
Practically, all models of the human understanding of conditionals predict
a relationship with WMC: the theory of mental models predicts that a fully
ﬂeshed-out interpretation of a conditional requires higher WMC than an initial
interpretation. The Kamp and Reyle discourse model requires higher WMC for
conditionals than for conjunctions. Similar predictions may be derived from
the game-theoretic model of Hintikka and Carlson. Finally, the process model
shown in Figure 3 requires to store the intermediate results and to manage
the sequence of the steps in a well-organised way.
Table 7. Rating scales in Experiment 1: point biserial correlations between participants
giving most often conditional event interpretations (CE) or giving most often conjunction
interpretations (CON), on the one hand, and their conﬁdence ratings of being correct and
their difﬁculty ratings, on the other hand, respectively.
r(CE, conﬁdence) r(CON, conﬁdence) r(CE, difﬁculty) r(CON, difﬁculty)
0.416 ¡0.281 0.165 ¡0.246
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To investigate the relationship between the interpretation of conditionals
and WMC, we included in Experiment 1 a procedure to measure WMC. We
used a 2-back task (Garcia-Madruga, Gutierrez, Carriedo, Luzon, & Vila, 2007;
Greenspan & Segal, 1984; Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colﬂesh, 2007; Lewandow-
sky, Brown, & Thomas, 2000; Logan, 1994; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000; Szmalec,
Verbruggen, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 2011), where a good performance
requires a high degree of attention and control to keep track of the serial
order of a stream of digits. It also involves primary memory span and protec-
tion against interference.
Method
The 2-back task was run on a computer and controlled by a Python (Van Ros-
sum and the Python Software Foundation, 2008) program which was sup-
ported by the PyGame library (Shinners, 2011). The task was presented on a
1900 screen.
The task consisted of a sequence of 144 test trials. On each trial, a digit
between 1 and 9 appeared in the middle of the screen. Each trial began with
a centred ﬁxation cross displayed for 1000 ms after which it was replaced by
a centred numeral for 500 ms; ﬁnally, the screen was cleared for the remain-
ing 2000 ms, giving participants a total of 2500 ms to respond. Participants
had to decide whether the currently presented numeral was the same as the
numeral seen two steps back in the sequence. They were asked to press a YES
or a NO button on a response box. The task included also 1-back and 3-back
lure trials where the currently presented numeral matched the numeral one
step or three steps back in the sequence. In total, there were 18 2-back tar-
get trials, 9 1-back lure trials and 9 3-back lure trials. The session began with
10 practice trials with feedback to ensure participants understood the task.
Of the 144 digits presented, there were 108 non-target non-lure trials.
Response times were measured by the computer.
The responses were also classiﬁed as hits, misses, false alarms, correct
rejections, silent on foils (no response at a NO-trial within the ﬁxed time win-
dow), and silent on target (no response at a YES-trial). All participants of
Experiment 1 were administered the 2-back task after den Card Task.
Results
For each participant, the number of hits, missed targets, false alarms, correct
rejections, lure-1, and lure-3 were counted. The six statistical analyses resulted
in one signiﬁcant result: participants with modal conditional event response
have fewer lure-3 responses (mean = 2.073) than participants with modal
responses that are not conditional event responses (mean =3.28), (pMCMC
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.004, intercept 3.285, posterior mean = ¡1.208, 95% highest-posterior-den-
sity (HPD) interval [¡2.041, ¡0.419]).
Figure 7 shows the 52 biserial correlations between the conditional event
interpretation and (i) the number of correct rejections and (ii) the number of
lure-3 responses in the 2-back task. Although most absolute values are low
(below .3), the coefﬁcients are either all positive (correct rejections) or all neg-
ative (lure-3). Despite the involved variables are not independent, this sup-
ports the hypothesis of a relationship between WMC and the interpretation
of conditionals. We performed the same analysis for the conjunction interpre-
tations. For the conjunction, the values are distributed approximately sym-
metrically around a mean of zero.
The participants have some knowledge how good they were in the 2-back
task. In the rating scales administered after the 2-back task,conﬁdence of being
correct correlates with the hit rate (.31) and negatively with the false alarm
(¡.27). The conﬁdence rating in the 2-back task correlates with the rating for
difﬁculty (¡.51). We did not observe a signiﬁcant relationship between the
response times in the 2-back task and the Card Task.
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Figure 7. 2-Back task: point-biserial correlations between the number of conditional
event interpretations in the Card Task and the number of correct rejections (upper line)
and lure-3 (lower line) at the 52 task positions in the 2-back task.
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Discussion
The results show a relationship – although a weak one – between the inter-
pretation of conditionals and working memory. The n-back task measures in
the ﬁrst line control processes of the working memory (Kane et al., 2007). The
lure-3 score and the score for the correct rejections are not indicators of the
capacity of working memory in the sense of buffer size. Kane et al. (2007)
have argued, for example, that the n-back task and the span of working mem-
ory correlate only weakly. A low lure-3 score is an indicator that a participant
is able to block competing but inappropriate content. Low lure-3 and high
correct rejection scores show efﬁcient protection against interference and
distractions.
The process model in Figure 3 requires a stepwise processing: the repre-
sentation of the antecedent, the representation of the pair (antecedent, con-
sequent), going back to the antecedent, counting and relating the
intermediate results in the X-out-of-Y assessment, etc. Keeping track of this
sequence presupposes the multifaceted capabilities of working memory –
working memory not in the sense of a buffer but in the sense of the interfer-
ence model of Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, and Greaves (2012).
Moreover, in their interference model, a lure-3 response in the 2-back task
may result from a mismanagement of setting relative position markers in a
serial stream of items. This does also not involve buffer size or decay of mem-
ory traces but the assignment and removal of markers to items. This explains
as the “common cause” the correlation between the lure-3 score and the con-
ditional event interpretation.
Probabilistic modus ponens task
The modus ponens
From H;H! Ef g infer E
is the most important inference rule in logic. It has often been studied in
human reasoning and has been found to be endorsed by practically all peo-
ple. We give the major premise H ! E a conditional event interpretation so
that its uncertainty is expressed by a conditional probability. The probabilistic
version of the modus ponens is then given by Pfeifer and Kleiter (2005b), Pfei-
fer and Kleiter (2009)
From P Hð Þ ¼ a; P EjHð Þ ¼ bf g infer P Eð Þ2 ab; 1 aþ ab½ : (6)
The judgements of the probability of the conclusion of a modus ponens are
expected to agree with the probability resulting from the conditional event
interpretation of the conditional in the major premise of the argument form.
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The lower and upper probabilities of the conclusion may be derived from the
theorem of total probability, P Eð Þ ¼ P Hð ÞP EjHð Þ þ P H P EjH , where P EjH 
is not given and may thus have any value between 0 and 1.
In Experiment 2, we included a probabilistic modus ponens in which P(H) is
imprecise. Most experimental inference tasks in the probabilistic approach to
human reasoning involve precise (point) probabilities of the premises. In real
life, however, the uncertainty of the premises is usually imprecise. Imprecision
may be modelled mathematically by interval probabilities or by second order
probability distributions. For an example of the application of second-order
distributions, see the analysis of the pseudodiagnosticity task of Michael Doh-
erty in Tweney, Doherty, and Kleiter (2010) and Kleiter (2015).
Method
To each of the 100 participants of Experiment 2, a series of 18 probabilistic
modus ponens tasks was administered. The presentation of each task was
computer controlled by a program written in Python (Van Rossum and the
Python Software Foundation, 2008) and supported by the PyGame library
(Shinners, 2011). Each of the 18 tasks was presented on a 1900 screen. The text
and the schematic pictures of the cards were nicely positioned on the screen.
The task was administered after the Card Task.
Here is a stack of 20 cards. 12 cards are red, 8 are blue. (A series of 12 red and 8
blue rectangles was shown in one row). You shufﬂe the cards carefully. Now you
take the ﬁrst 10 cards (empty white cards were shown) one by one and do the
following:
If the card is red, then you draw a ﬂower on it.
Now you put the 10 cards back into the original stack and shufﬂe the 20 cards
again carefully. You draw one card randomly. How sure are you that the card
shows a ﬂower (approximately is sufﬁcient)?
At the bottom of the display, response buttons from 0% to 100% in steps
of 5 % were shown. The response was selected by a mouse click on one of
the 21 buttons.
The number of red cards (out of 20) was r = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18. The
number of white cards was either w = 5, 10, or 15. To shorten the experimen-
tal sessions, not all of the possible 8 £ 3 = 24 possible task combinations
were presented but only 18. Denoting each task by the number of white cards
and the number red cards, the following 18 combinations were used: (2,10),
(4,5), (4,10), (4, 15), (6, 10), (8, 5), (8, 10), (12,5), (12, 10), (12, 15), (14, 10), (16, 5),
(16, 10), (16, 15), and (18, 10). In all 18 tasks, the total number of cards was n =
20. There were four presentation orders. A pseudo-random order was pre-
sented forward, backward, middle to the last and from the middle to the ﬁrst
task, from the middle to the ﬁrst and from middle to the last task, respectively.
Because of an error in one of the control ﬁles, 130 responses (ﬁve tasks for
26 participants) of the 18,000 responses had to be treated as missing data.
26 G. D. KLEITER ET AL.
For 26 participants, ﬁve tasks were presented two times. We discarded the
response to the second presentation.
Assuming identical and independent sampling and assuming that no
ﬂower is drawn on a blue card, the expected number of red cards in a sample
of w white cards is E(r) = w ¢ r/n. The expected number of cards showing a
ﬂower in the stack of n cards is thus (w ¢ r/n)/n = w ¢ r/n2. In the example, we
have P(r) = 12/20 = 3/5, the expected number of red cards among the 10
white cards is 10 ¢ 3/5 = 6, and the probability to draw a ﬂower from the stack
of 20 cards is 6/20 = .30. This is the “normative” value to which the partici-
pants’ responses are compared. Note that because P EjH  ¼ 0, Equation (6)
simpliﬁes. The solution becomes a point value. A more sophisticated analysis
would work with a mixture of binomial distributions and thus invoke the
imprecision involved in the task.
Results
For each of the 18 tasks, the (signed) difference between the actual response
minus the normative value was determined and used as the dependent vari-
able in a Gaussian linear random effects model. The MCMCglmm analysis
showed that the responses of the participants with modal conditional event
interpretations are closer to the normative values than the responses of the
participants with other modal responses (means 2.47 versus 3.08, pMCMC 
.0001). The main gender effect showed that overall female participants were
closer to the normative values (mean 2.66 versus 2.82, pMCMC  .0001). In
addition, the interaction term gender £ modal response shows that
females with conditional event interpretations are close to the normative val-
ues (mean 2.02, i.e., about 10% difference) and females with other interpreta-
tions (most of them conjunction) are distant (mean 3.30).
The relationship between the conditional event interpretation and the
probabilistic modus ponens demonstrates the central role of the interpreta-
tion of conditionals in a complex reasoning task.
Bookbag and poker chip task
Conditional probabilities play an important role in Bayesian updating one's
beliefs in the light of new evidence. When learning from new evidence, the
conditioning events are not suppositions but observed data. In the early days
of judgement under uncertainty, human updating of probabilities was com-
pared with normative updating according to Bayes Theorem. The bookbag
and poker chip task is a classical task of judgement under uncertainty and
decision-making. It was introduced by Phillips and Edwards (1966). Later on, it
was investigated, among others, by Du Charme (1970) and Slovic and Lichten-
stein (1971). In Experiment 3, we tried to ﬁnd a relationship between the inter-
pretation of conditionals and Bayesian probability updating. Participants with
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conditional event interpretations are expected to be closer to normative
updating than participants with conjunction interpretations.
Method
Usually, probabilistic inference tasks are paper-and-pencil tasks or adminis-
tered via a computer. The tasks are explained by vignettes and the partici-
pants are asked to imagine some hypothetical situation. We chose a more
scenic urn model, avoided the computer, paper and pencils, and took real
urns, chips, and balls.
The task consisted of two parts. In part I, the participants saw a box that
contained four chips; one chip was marked with the letter A, two chips were
marked with the letter B, and one was marked with the letter C. The partici-
pant drew one chip blindly from the box and gave it to the experimenter. The
“base rates” of drawing the letters A, B, or C were thus .25, .5, and .25, respec-
tively. The letter on the chip drawn in part I determined part II.
In part II, there were three cups, the A, B, and the C cup. Cup A contained 2
red and 3 blue balls, cup B contained 4 red and 1 blue ball, and cup C con-
tained 5 red and no blue ball. The experimenter selected the cup correspond-
ing to the letter on the chip drawn by the participant in part I. The participant
could not see the number of red or blue chips in the cup. The experimenter
placed the cup in a larger urn-like box so that the participant could easily
draw balls from the cup, but could not see the colour of the balls. The experi-
menter asked the participant
“What colour will the ﬁrst ball be that you draw from the cup?” (red or blue)
“How sure are you? Give a percentage number between 0 and 100”.
The participant drew a ball, checked its colour, and put the ball back into
the cup. This was repeated ten times, where “ﬁrst ball” in the question was
replaced by “next ball”. Each time the participant predicted the colour of the
next ball and told the experimenter a percentage number between 0 and 100.
Five tasks were administered to each participant. There were thus 50
assessments from each participant, 10 assessments for each of the ﬁve tasks.
The ﬁve bookbag and poker chip tasks were administered after the Card Task.
The probability that the next ball will be red, ri+1, i = 1,…, 10, given that the
last ni draws resulted in fi(r) red balls is obtained from the product of the prob-
ability of urn j, j = 1, 2, 3, times the likelihood of drawing a red ball from urn j.
P riþ1ð Þ ¼
X3
k¼1
P ujjni; fi rð Þ
 
P rjuj
 
: (7)
The prior probabilities of the three urns A, B, and C are .25, .5, and .25, respec-
tively. The probability of urn j after observing fi(r) red balls is obtained from
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Bayes’ theorem
P ujjni; fi rð Þ
  ¼ P uj
 
P fi rð Þjuj
 
P3
k¼1 P uið ÞP fi rð Þjuj
  : (8)
The likelihoods are the binomials
P uj
  ¼ ni
fi rð Þ
 	
p
fi rð Þ
j 1 pfi rð Þj

 
: (9)
The probability of drawing a red ball from urn A, B, and C are p1 = 2/5 = .4,
p2 = 4/5 = .8, and p3 = 5/5 = 1, respectively.
Results
Each participant had a different history of randomly drawn balls from the
urns. So we evaluated for each participant trial by trial the normative proba-
bilities applying Equation (9). We took the (signed) difference “rating minus
normative value” as the dependent variable.
The MCMCglmm analysis showed a strong position effect of the 10 trials
(posterior mean 2.751, pMCMC  .0001). At the beginning, the predictive
probabilities were too low, toward the end they were too high. There was a
signiﬁcant interaction gender:conditional event interpretation.
Of the participants with predominately conditional event interpretations,
males gave higher predictive probability estimates than females (posterior
mean 2.329 versus -2.685, pMCMC  .001). Especially, toward the end of the
10 trials, male participants were overconﬁdent. For participants who gave pre-
dominantly conjunction or other interpretations, there were no differences
between female and male participants.
Discussion
The results demonstrate that the interpretation of conditionals is relevant for
the performance of a typical judgement under uncertainty task and vice
versa. Participants with different interpretations of conditionals in the Card
Task differ in their probability estimates in the bookbag and poker chip task.
Updating one's beliefs is closely related to the interpretation of conditionals.
Bayes theorem involves (i) the removal of possible but not observed evidence
and (ii) the restandardisation of the prior probabilities. In our process model
(compare step e in Figure 3), Bayes theorem would replace the hypothetical
by a factual mark. The restandardisation is already represented in Figure 3 by
the projection of X on Y.
We note that a classical task in the ﬁeld of judgement under uncertainty,
the framing task (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), uses conditionals to explain
conditional probabilities: “If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
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If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved”. By default, the readers are
assumed to interpret the uncertainty of the if–then sentence as a conditional
probability.
General discussion
In three experiments with a total number of 240 participants, the conditional
event interpretation is the dominating interpretation of if–then sentences.
About 75% of the participants interpret if–then sentences as conditional
events. There is, however, a group of about 20% of the participants who inter-
pret if–then sentences as conjunctions. We did not observe any other system-
atic interpretations, speciﬁcally, no material implication or biconditionals.
A stable conditional event interpretation requires the activation of the
truth conditions of a conditional event. This can become a routine during
working through a sequence of tasks of the same type. The conjunction
response does not necessarily imply that the core meaning of the conditional
is a conjunction. It may easily be the case that the solution process gets stuck
at an intermediate processing step. While building the discourse representa-
tion structure, the antecedent is not reprocessed or not assumed to be veri-
ﬁed. This leads to the activation of the truth conditions of a conjunction.
Incomplete processing may evoke a sudden shift of the interpretation (Fugard
et al., 2011). The binding of the antecedent and the consequent is moderated
by the perceived relevance of the antecedent (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016).
The remaining 5% of unsystematic interpretations may result from erroneous
perceptual scanning or from miscounting.
We see the conditional event interpretation at the core of a process model.
This claim is supported by the participants’ evaluation of their own responses.
Participants with conditional event interpretations were conﬁdent that their
answers were correct and that they understood the tasks well. The number of
conditional event interpretations increased in the course of the experimental
sessions. Change-point analyses showed that all changes are from “some”
interpretation to a conditional event interpretation, most often from conjunc-
tion to conditional event. No one of the 240 participants changed in a differ-
ent direction. The Card Task used in the present experiments improved the
methodology of the Die Task used in our previous study (Fugard et al., 2011).
The number of conditional event interpretations in the present experiments
is higher than in our previous one. The improvements in the methodology
led to results closer to the present process model.
The logical core of the human understanding of conditionals is the condi-
tional event in the sense of de Finetti (Coletti & Scozzafava, 2005; de Finetti,
1995, 1974). We propose to extend this core meaning by Kamp's and Reyle's
(1993) discourse representation theory. The treatment of the comprehension
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of conditionals in this theory ﬁts nicely the suppositional approach of Evans
et al. (2003) and Over and Evans (2003). We try to explain the sequential cog-
nitive processing of conditionals by a simple discourse representation model.
To encode the meaning of a conditional requires at least three steps: (i) repre-
senting the antecedent, (ii) extending the representation by the pair (ante-
cedent, consequent), and (iii) going back to the antecedent and assuming it
to be veriﬁed. The conjunction interpretation gets stuck in the second step,
takes the pair (antecedent, consequent) as a conjunction and thus neglects to
reprocess the antecedent and to see the conjunction on the background of
the antecedent. As a consequence in the Card Task, the count of the (object,
colour) or (colour, object) cards is not standardised by the count of the ante-
cedent cards. Only the cards matching those objects and colours mentioned
in the conditional are counted.
We found a weak but reliable correlation between conditional event inter-
pretations and working memory, measured by the number of lure-3
responses in the 2-back task. Memory control processes protect against inter-
ference and block competing memory material (Oberauer, 2005; Oberauer
et al., 2012). These processes organise the various passes in the Kamp and
Reyle model and block lures in the n-back task. Working memory is conceived
as an efﬁcient attention control system, not as the size of a memory buffer.
The experiments reported by Unsworth (2015) investigated the relationship
between reasoning tasks and working memory capacity. The reasoning tasks
they used, however, were mainly intelligence tests (Raven test, Cattell's cul-
ture fair intelligence test), not tasks speciﬁcally related to deductive or induc-
tive reasoning. Compare also Markovits and Barrouillet (2002), Markovits,
Doyon, and Simoneau (2002), and Halford, Andrews, and Wilson (2015).
The conjunction interpretation of a conditional does not loop back to the
antecedent (step e in Figure 3). It does not re-standardise the conjunction
probability in terms of the probability of the antecedent. The discourse repre-
sentation structure involves the same looping back to an already processed
entity. Such an “inhibition of return” (IOR) is described in the research on
visual attention and refers to the inhibition to attend two times in succession
to the same location (Logan, 1994).
The game-theoretical semantics suggests the speculation of an inner dia-
logue. It suggests a relationship to Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models.
The theory proposes a ﬁnal processing stage in which reasoners test their
conclusions by a search for counter-examples. This may well involve a “virtual
theater” where different players exchange arguments which attack and
defend assumptions or consequences. Especially, the conditional event inter-
pretation (Figure 4) requires to hypothetically switch roles and to search for
wins or losses.
With respect to the order of objects (“The card shows a car”) and colours
(“The card shows red”), we replicated the ﬁnding of our previous experiment
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(Fugard et al., 2011). At the beginning of the experiments, responses for the
object-colour order are faster than for the colour-object order and the rela-
tionship reverses towards the end of the sequence. Similarly, at the begin-
ning, object–colour tasks produce slightly more conditional event
interpretations than at the end. A plausible explanation is that the recognition
of the colour of the objects is easy and fast and the participants learn during
the course of the experiment to attend to the colour ﬁrst.
The X-out-of-Y response format requires a warning. It might suggest that
conditional probabilities can only be assessed with the help of two probabili-
ties, the probability of a conjunction and the probability of the conditioning
event. This is not true. Conditional probabilities may be assessed directly. All
that is needed is to mark the conditioning event as hypothetically true (see
Mark as suppositional in the process model under point (e)). This constrains
the universe of possibilities. In the Card Task, the X-out-of-Y format functions
as a trick to distinguish the conditional event interpretation from a series of
other interpretations.
A deﬁcit in the probabilistic approach to reasoning is the poor embedding
into theories on cognitive processing (Kleiter, 1987). What Oberauer says
about working memory applies to our own work as well: “...theories on work-
ing memory in general, have so far remained verbal descriptions of mecha-
nisms. This is problematic because it is generally acknowledged that working
memory is a complex system, and comprehensive theories of working mem-
ory typically assume numerous mechanisms and processes that operate
together ...” (Oberauer et al., 2012, 780).
A good theory of the human understanding of connectives in reasoning
and problem solving requires the integration of several cognitive models
including models on: their formal interpretation, the steps involved in their
encoding in discourse processing, their pragmatics, their roles in deontic,
causal, couterfactual, and argumentative contexts, the role of semantic mem-
ory, of knowledge and beliefs, the representation of uncertainty and vague-
ness, the role of working memory, attention, and control, the role of
individual differences (including gender), and cognitive development.
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